On Transatlantic Tensions: A Way Out and a Way Forward
Though there have been some positive developments as a result of the Trump administrations insistence that Europe commit more to NATO, strategic incompetence and threats have let down long standing allies and brought about severe tensions in the transatlantic partnership. Perhaps it will not occur under this administration, but the United States will have to make several fundamental shifts in approach. These are not merely diplomatic gestures but substantive policy changes that would demonstrate renewed American commitment to allied partnership. The attempt (hope?) here is to look beyond the populist/petty nationalist moment, which now is in full swing in the United States, keeping in mind such movements have also gained momentum in Europe.
1. Reaffirm NATO's core principle
The United States must unequivocally reaffirm Article 5 commitments without qualification or conditions based on defense spending. While pushing allies to increase defense budgets is legitimate, making Article 5 guarantees conditional on spending levels fundamentally undermines collective defense. The correct approach is to strengthen European defense capacity within NATO, not create uncertainty about whether the United States would actually respond to an attack on an ally.
2. Operationalize the Minerals Security Partnership
Rather than threatening allies over resources, the United States should lead in making the MSP a genuine framework for cooperation.
-Joint investment in Greenland's mineral development through the MSP, with Denmark and Greenland as full partner
-Coordinated processing infrastructure investments in North America and Europe to reduce Chinese dominance
-Technology transfer and capacity building that creates sustainable industries in allied countries
-Transparent, rules-based resource agreements that contrast with China's opaque Belt and Road projects
This would offer Greenland economic development, Denmark enhanced security, European allies reduced dependence on China, and the United States reliable access to critical resources all while strengthening the alliance
3. European defense integration within NATO
The United States should actively support European efforts to build interoperable defense capabilities within the NATO framework.
-Encouraging joint European procurement to achieve economies of scale
-Sharing technology and supporting European defense industrial capacity
-Welcoming initiatives like the Coalition of the Willing as complementary to NATO, not competitive with it
-Recognizing that a militarily capable Europe that can handle regional conflict frees American resources for Indo-Pacific priorities.
The goal should be European allies who can defend themselves and contribute meaningfully to collective defense, not European dependency.
4. Stop Supporting Anti-NATO, Anti-European Political Forces
The U.S. National Security Strategy's explicit support for “patriotic European parties” that oppose EU integration and NATO cooperation is strategically incoherent. These states, often backed financially by Russia, work to undermine alliance structures. American policy cannot simultaneously claim to support NATO while backing political forces dedicated to weakening it. The United States should return to the bipartisan tradition of supporting democratic institutions and transatlantic cooperation, not attempting to reshape European politics through support for populist movements.
5. Cooperation on Ukrainian security
The U.S. role in Ukrainian security guarantees needs to be formalized. Rather than the current uncertainty, the United States should commit to a structured role in long-term military assistance frameworks, intelligence sharing and coordinated response plans in case of renewed Russian aggression. This provides Ukraine with credible security guarantees while demonstrating reliable American commitment to allies.
All this may seem sound, which raises the question; Why isn’t it being done? Or at the very least, why isn’t it being done in a diplomatic manner? Is Donald Trump’s rhetoric merely a means of spurring on European defense? Was that the only way of achieving such a goal? Or is there genuine instability behind this administrations foreign policies? Having to ask such questions, who could blame Europe for looking to build an insurance policy? On the other hand, this administration’s approach to many issues has proven unpopular with the public, and we may well see someone promising a much more stable approach taking over in 2028.